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Abstract
The article deals with the problem of optimal location of production
and distribution points in the vertices of the transportation network
considered as an investment project. On the network set production
of raw materials points and demand points.
Keywords: facility location problem, Floyd algorithm, compromise so-
lution, Cournot-Nash equilibrium, graph theory.
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1 Introduction
Facility location problems study how to best locate facilities under the as-
sumption that consumers will go to the facility that is most profitable to
them. Hotelling (1929) introduced an influential competitive facility loca-
tion model where each of two players select a location in a linear segment
and price of consumption is constant. Economic agents (players, owners), in
this model, is to maximize their demand. It’s model a non-cooperative game
with equilibrium. Facility location games have several applications related
rumor dissemination, seeding in social networks and product differentiation
models (Bharathi et al. 2007, Kostka et al. 2008). The following articles
consider spatial competition in a continuous space with a Nash equilibrium.
( Eaton and Lipsey 1976, Graitson 1982, D’Aspremont et al. 1983, de Palma
et al. 1985, Gabszewicz and Thisse 1986). In the following articles, a model
of the circular city of Salopa is considered (Salop 1979, Eiselt and Laporte
1989, Eiselt et al. 1993, Eiselt and Laporte 1996, Plastria 2001, ReVelle and
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Eiselt 2005, Smith et al. 2009, Dasci 2011, Kress and Pesch 2012). The fol-
lowing articles consider the possibility of the existence of Nash equilibrium
for complex network structures( D¨urr and Thang 2007). Nash equilibrium,
Stackelberg games and models where agents locate facilities sequentially
are considered in several articles ( Hay 1976, Prescott and Visscher 1977,
Drezner 1982, ReVelle 1986, Hakimi 1983, Hakimi 1986, Leonardi and Tadei
1984, Drezner and Drezner 1996, Drezner 1998, Leonardi and Tadei 1984,
Drezner and Drezner 1996) applying a gravity rule and defining a sphere of
influence ( Drezner 1995a, Drezner et al. 2002, Drezner and Drezner 2004,
ReVelle 1986, Drezner et al. 2011 ). Co-operative games and competition
with prices (Vetta 2002, Mirrokni and Vetta 2004, Jain and Mahdian 2007).
The following problem is considered. In some vertices of the network
there are goods demand points and production points of raw materials.
On the set of network edges, the function of transport-corruption costs is
defined, which denotes the cost of moving along the edges of the network be-
tween the vertices of the network. All vertices of the network are connected,
that is, from any vertex of the network there exists a possibly non-unique
path to any other vertex of the network.
For each demand point for a product, the quantity of goods that it wishes
to buy is given. The amount of expenses for meeting the demand is equal to:
the amount of costs for the purchase of goods, the amount of costs for moving
between the vertices of the network to the goods distribution points. It is
assumed that each demand point for goods chooses the distribution point of
goods to meet their demand for goods, based on minimizing their amount
of costs to meet their demand for the goods.
Owners of goods distribution points and goods production points wish
to location their goods production points and goods distribution points at
the vertices of the network in the most profitable way for them in terms of
maximizing the revenue from selling this product. Thus arises the optimal
location problem of goods distribution points and goods production points
on a given network, in accordance with selected principle of optimality.
Papers related to the theme of this article are [1 - 35].
2 Formalization of the problem of optimal location
of goods production points and goods distribu-
tion points at the vertices of the network
Let a network with a capacity (N, k) be given on a plane, where N is a
finite set of nodes, k is a capacity function that maps to each edge of the
network (x, y), (x, y) ∈ N is a nonnegative number k(x, y) ≥ 0. Let also in
some vertices of the network making up the set L = (l1, ..., lh), there are
production points of raw materials necessary for the production of goods at
the production points of the goods, and at the vertices composing the set
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K = (k1, ..., ks) are the demand points for the goods.We denote the set of
goods production points by M = (m1...mn). The set of goods distribution
points will be denoted by W = (w1...wn). On the set E of edges of the net-
work (N, k), the transport-corruption cost function C : E → R1, C(x, y) ≥ 0
is given. It is assumed that the vertices of the network (N, k) are connected
to each other, that is, from any vertex of the network there exists a path to
any other vertex of the network, or perhaps multiple.
Owners of goods production points and goods distribution points R =
(R1, ..., Rn) assign prices for the goods they produce P = (p1...pn). In doing
so, they tend to maximize their profits. We believe that the demand points
for the goods satisfy their demand at the point of distribution of the goods,
where the total costs are minimal. Net income of the owners is the sum of
the funds received by them from the point of demand for the goods, minus
the cost of production of goods in locations of production of goods, the
costs of distribution of goods to goods distribution points, the costs for the
purchase of raw materials in the points production of raw materials and
transport and corruption costs.
TC(Ri) - is the net income of the owner Ri.
TC(Ri) = P (wi)D(wi)− (C(Ri) + PW (Ri) + PM(Ri) + PL(Ri))
P (wi) - is the price assigned at the goods distribution points wi for the
goods.
D(wi) - is the demand at the distribution point of the commodity wi, which
consists of the demand of all points of demand for the goods that satisfy
their demand at the distribution point of goods wi.
C(Ri) - all transport-corruption costs of the owner of goods production
points and goods distribution points Ri.
PW (Ri) - costs of the owner Ri of goods distribution points and points of
production of goods for the distribution of goods.
PM(Ri) - costs of the owner Ri of goods distribution points and points of
production of goods for the production of goods.
PL(Ri) - the total cost of raw materials for the owner Ri.
The net income of each owner of the goods distribution points and goods
production points is represented by a table, by columns of which we indicate
the net incomes of each owner TC(Ri), and by rows the possible locations
of goods production points and goods distribution points at the vertices of
the network and the price pi for unit of output.
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TC(R1) ...
(p1,m1, w1)...(p1, mn−1, wn−1), (p1,mn, wt) TC(R1(p1,m1, w1)) ...
(p1,m1, w1)...(p1, mn, wt), (p1,mn−1, wt−1) TC(R1(p1,m1, w1)) ...
... ... ...
(p2,m1, w1)...(p1, mn−1, wt−1), (p1,mn, wt) TC(R1(p2,m1, w1)) ...
... ... ...
(p2,m1, w1)...(p2, mn−1, wt−1), (p2,mn, wt) TC(R1(p2,m1, w1)) ...
... ... ...
(pl,mn, wn)...(pl,m2, w2), (pl,m1, w1) TC(R1(pl,mn, wt)) ...
Owners of goods distribution points and goods production points agree
among themselves on the location of their own points of production of goods
and distribution points at the vertices of the network on the basis of some
optimality principle. For example, a compromise solution or a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, algorithms for finding which are described below.
The compromise set is defined by the following formula:
CH = {x ∈ X|max
i
(Mi −Hi(x)) ≤ max
i
(Mi −Hi(x
′))∀x′ ∈ X}.
Otherwise, the compromise set can be defined as follows
Let X be the set of admissible solutions
Hi : X → R1 - the income function of the agent i on the solution set.
Let M = (M1...Mn)
Mi = max
x∈X
Hi(x)
M is an ideal vector
We choose a fixed x ∈ X and calculate the residual vector for it.
∆(x) = {Mi −Hi(x)}
n
1
For each x ∈ X
max
i∈I
{Mi −Hi(x)}
n
1
The compromise set CnX is
argmin
x∈X
max
i
δ(x) = CnX
Algorithm for finding a compromise solution.
Step 1. Let Z be the set of admissible solutions zs ∈ Z,
where zs = ((p
i1
1
m
j1
1
w
q1
1
), ..., (pil
l
m
jn
n w
qt
t )),
i1 = 1, i1, j1 = 1, j1, w1 = 1, w1, il = 1, il, jn = 1, jn, wq = 1, wq,
- these are the possible vertices of the location of goods production points
and goods distribution points at specified prices, and s is the index by which
all permissible solutions are renumbered and s = 1, ..., s.
4
TC (R1 (zs)), ..., TC (Rn (zs)) is the net income of the i owner of the goods
production points and distribution points for a given zs. Let us construct
an ideal vector M = [M1, ..., Mn] = (max (TC (R1 (zs))), ..., max (TC (Rn
(zs)))) is the maximum income of the j-th owner of the goods production
points and distribution points.
Step 2. For each feasible solution zs, s = 1, ..., s, we form the residual
matrix, which in this case will have the form
A∗ = (M1 − TC(R1(zs))), ..., (Mn − TC(Rn(zs))) = (αs...βs),
where s = 1...s.
Step 3. In the resulting residual matrix, for each solution zs, s = 1, ..., s
from the columns (αs...βs), we select the maximum value γs = max
s
(αs...βs).
Step 4. We choose the minimal of these maximal solutions min = γs,
which will be a compromise solution.
Algorithm for finding the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the type of solution of a game of two or
more players in which neither of the participants can increase his winnings
by changing his decision if other participants do not change their decisions.
Let’s make a table, according to the columns and rows of which we can get
the possible location of the goods production points and distribution points
at the vertices of the network at the indicated prices. As a payoff function,
the net income of each owner of the goods production points and goods
distribution points is considered.
Step 1. Find the maximum value of winning by rows.
Step 2. Find the maximum value of winning by columns.
Step 3. We consider the intersection of the obtained maxima. Where
the intersection exists, this is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Algorithm for solving the problem of optimal location of goods produc-
tion points and goods distribution points at the vertices of the network.
1. Set a price P = (p1...pn) per unit of the produced goods for each
vertex of the possible location of goods distribution points W = (w1...wn);
2. Calculate the total cost goods for goods demand points, taking into
account the costs of purchasing the goods and the transport-corruption costs
of moving to the goods distribution points. Using the Floyd algorithm, to
find the shortest path between the vertices of a graph, to count transport-
corruption costs. For each of demand point for goods, determine the optimal
distribution point of goods to meet demand;
3. Calculate the amount of demand for goods in the wi distribution
point of goods, which equals the sum of the demand for the goods of all
goods demand points that satisfy their demand in the wi distribution point
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of goods;
4. Calculate all the transport-corruption costs of C(mn, wn) for each
possible location of goods production points M = (m1...mn) and goods
distribution points W = (w1...wn), using Floyd’s algorithm for finding the
shortest path between the vertices of the graph;
5. Calculate the net income of TC(Ri(pl,mn, wt)) of each owner of goods
distribution points and goods production points;
6. Using the algorithm for finding a compromise solution or the algo-
rithm for finding the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we find the optimal location
of the goods production points and goods distribution points;
3 Example
Let (N,K) be a network with a capacity, where N is the vertex set and
the capacity function k that associates with each edge (x, y) a nonnegative
number k(x, y) containing 8 vertices and 7 edges. For each network edge
transport-corruption costs are set.
The function of transport-corruption costs of the (N, k) network is rep-
resented by the matrix C, where columns and rows indicate transport-
corruption costs for each edge of the network:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0 1 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
2 1 0 2 2 2 ∞ ∞ ∞
3 ∞ 2 0 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
4 ∞ 2 ∞ 0 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
5 ∞ 2 ∞ ∞ 0 3 ∞ ∞
6 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 3 0 3 3
7 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 3 0 ∞
8 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 3 ∞ 0
L = (l1
1
) - location of the production point of raw materials
P (l1
1
) = 1 - the cost of a raw material unit
K = (k4
1
, k5
2
, k8
3
) - location goods demand points
D = (10, 10, 10) - the value of demand in the demand points
W = (w2
1
, w6
2
) - possible location of goods distribution points
PW = (10, 10) - value of distribution costs
M = (m3
1
,m7
2
) - possible location of goods production points
PM = (40, 40) - the cost of production costs
P = (p1) = (10) - possible prices for the goods
We use the Floyd algorithm to find the shortest path between the vertices
of the network and the calculated transport-corruption costs for the goods
demand points.
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w1 w2
k1 2 7
k2 2 3
k3 8 3
The income of distribution points for given prices is (p1, w1; p1, w2).
P (wi)D(wi)
w1 200
w2 100
We will calculate the costs of each combination of goods distribution
points and points of production goods:
C(w1,m1) + PW + PM
(w1,m1) 75
(w1,m2) 87
(w2,m1) 70
(w2,m2) 72
We calculate the net income TC(wi,mi)
TC(wi,mi)
(w1,m1) 125
(w1,m2) 113
(w2,m1) 30
(w2,m2) 28
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
TC(R2(p
2
1
, w2
1
,m2
1
)) TC(R2(p
2
1
, w2
1
,m2
2
))
TC(R1(p
1
1
, w1
1
,m1
1
)) (125,0) (125,0)
TC(R1(p
1
1
, w1
1
,m1
2
)) (113,0 ) (113,0 )
TC(R1(p
1
1
, w1
2
,m1
1
)) (30,0 ) (30,113 )
TC(R1(p
1
1
, w1
2
,m1
2
)) ( 28,125 ) (28,0 )
TC(R2(p
2
1
, w2
2
,m2
1
)) TC(R2(p
2
1
, w2
2
,m2
2
))
TC(R1(p
1
1
, w1
1
,m1
1
)) (125,0 ) (125,28)
TC(R1(p
1
1
, w1
1
,m1
2
)) (113,30) (113,0 )
TC(R1(p
1
1
, w1
2
,m1
1
)) (30,0 ) (30,0 )
TC(R1(p
1
1
, w1
2
,m1
2
)) (28,0 ) (28,0 )
The equilibrium solution according to this table is (125, 28). The location
of the goods production point of the first owner of the production and goods
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distribution points (R1) is at vertex 3, and the goods distribution point is
at vertex 2, at the selected price p1. The location of the production point
of the goods of the second owner of the production and distribution points
(R2) is at the vertex 7, and the item distribution point at the vertex 6, is
at the selected price p1.
4 Conclusion
Using the work model of location in the vertices of the network of goods
production points and goods distribution points, given the location of points
of production of raw materials and goods demand points, one can find the
optimal location of goods production points and distribution points at the
vertices of the network. The presented model can be used in practice. As an
example, we can consider vertically integrated engineering companies, that
wish to locate their engineering plant and storage in different cities located
at different distances from each other.
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